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Book Reviews
Ronald McCrum. The Men Who Lost Singapore, 1938-1942. 
Singapore: NUS Press, 2017. Pp. xvi + 265.
Just after midnight on 8 December 1941, Japanese troops came 
ashore at Kota Bharu, on the east coast of Malaya, in one of the 
opening moves of the Second World War in the Pacific.1 Two days 
later, Japanese aircraft sent the Royal Navy’s capital ships Prince of 
Wales and Repulse to the bottom of the South China Sea, effectively 
ending the navy’s ability to prevent further landings down the coast. 
Allied air assets in the region were destroyed so quickly that the 
Japanese had air superiority by the end of the first week of the 
campaign. Fighting their way down both sides of peninsular Malaya, 
often by leapfrogging ahead of the retreating ground forces by sea, 
the disciplined and aggressive Japanese invaders made short work of 
the inexperienced British, Australian, Indian, and Malay defenders. 
By the end of January 1942, the entire Malay peninsula was in 
Japanese hands, with only the narrow Johore Strait separating them 
from the island of Singapore. Japanese landings commenced on 8 
February, and by the evening of the fifteenth it was all over. The 
entire campaign lasted seventy days, surprising even the Japanese, 
who had estimated it would take one hundred.
Referred to by no less a personage than Winston Churchill as 
“the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history,”2 the 
fall of Singapore has spawned an enormous literature, as colossal 
1  The attack on Pearl Harbor commenced shortly afterwards. Due to the International 
Date Line, the date was 7 December in Hawaii. 
2  Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Abridged Edition, With an Epilogue 
on the Years 1945 to 1957 (London: Cassell, 1959), 518.
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military defeats usually do.3 Very few books, however, “examine in 
detail the role and the responsibilities of the colonial government 
both in the lead-up to the war and during it” (from the prologue, 
p. x), but that is precisely what Ronald McCrum, a retired British 
Army colonel with service in postwar Malaysia and Singapore,4 sets 
out to do in The Men Who Lost Singapore, 1938-1942. The fruit 
of extensive documentary research in archives on both sides of the 
world, the portraits of the civilian leadership painted here reveal a 
group of men extraordinary for their mediocrity. For example, C.A. 
Vlieland, a senior member of the Malayan Civil Service appointed 
in 1938 as Secretary for Defence, Malaya—and tasked, moreover, 
with a study of emergency food supplies—thought that it would 
be better to have no military reinforcements sent to the region due 
to the difficulty in feeding them. Alfred Duff Cooper, assigned to 
Singapore as Minister Resident in September 1941, had been a failure 
as Minister of Information in Churchill’s cabinet. Receiving little 
cooperation from local authorities resentful of this intrusion into their 
affairs, his appointment was terminated the following January. As 
for the governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, the picture emerges of an 
unimaginative administrator who stuck to his instructions from the 
Colonial Office to maintain the production of rubber and tin at all 
costs. His “renunciation of reality” (p. 160) in the face of rapidly 
approaching defeat went as far as to refuse to release civilian labour 
for the construction of defensive works because it would be “bad for 
the morale of the population” (p. 10). With a cast of characters such 
as this, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the administration 
of the Far East functioned for London, at least in part, as a dumping 
ground for second-rate talent.
3  In addition to Churchill’s Second World War and the titles cited below, any overview 
should include the relevant volume of the official history: S. Woodburn Kirby et al., 
The War Against Japan, vol. 1, The Loss of Singapore (London: H.M. Stationery 
Office, 1957). The works of Louis Allen, a Japanese-speaking intelligence officer 
during the war, should not be ignored: see his Singapore 1941-1942 (London: Davis-
Poynter, 1977). The most prolific author in this field today would probably have to 
be Brian P. Farrell, professor of history at the National University of Singapore; most 
recently, see his co-edited work with Sandy Hunter, A Great Betrayal? The Fall of 
Singapore Revisited (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2010).
4  “Five Minutes with Ronald McCrum,” News, NUS Press, 24 February 2017, 
https://nuspress.nus.edu.sg/blogs/news/five-minutes-with-ronald-mccrum. The 
book itself, oddly enough, does not provide this information, describing the author 
on the back cover simply as a retired British Army officer. 
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The quality of the military leadership in theatre serves, if 
anything, to strengthen this impression. The Commander-in-Chief, 
Far East Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, 
returned to active service in 1939 at the age of sixty-one after serving 
two years as governor of Kenya. Described by McCrum as “elderly,” 
“old-fashioned,” and “unsure” (p. 70), he was replaced in December 
1941 after little more than a year in the position.5 Lieutenant-
General Arthur Percival, General Officer Commanding Malaya, 
had commanded nothing larger than a division prior to receiving 
his appointment in March 1941.6 Unprepossessing in appearance and 
described as “not a leader” by Duff Cooper,7 his greatest failing was 
arguably his steadfast refusal, despite the impassioned pleas of his 
Chief Engineer, to allow fortifications to be built on the north shore 
of Singapore Island because, in his words (echoing the thinking of 
Governor Thomas), “defences are bad for morale—for both troops 
and civilians.”8 But the most controversial figure among the Allied 
leadership is probably Major-General Gordon Bennett, commander of 
the 8th Australian Division. Outspoken, impatient, and uncooperative 
with subordinates and superiors alike, he is perhaps best remembered 
for absconding at the last moment rather than going into captivity 
with Thomas, Percival, and the remaining men of his division. This 
action of his became the subject of a military court of inquiry and a 
Royal Commission in Australia after the war.
It may seem that the attention paid here to senior figures in the 
military is misplaced, but that is not the case; indeed, on more than 
one occasion I found myself flipping back to the prologue to confirm 
that the colonial government was, in fact, intended to be the primary 
focus of this book. Even the front cover, with its photographs of two 
military men and two civilians, suggests that equal attention will 
5  The photo of Brooke-Popham on the front cover, far left, amply justifies the 
“slightly baffled good nature” attributed to him by the writer J.G. Farrell, whose 
exhaustively researched historical novel The Singapore Grip (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1978; the quotation is from p. 117) covers the same period as McCrum’s 
volume and is highly recommended.
6  Arthur E. Percival, The War in Malaya (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949), 
24.
7  In a “secret and personal” letter to Churchill quoted on p. 156.
8  Ivan Simson, Singapore: Too Little, Too Late; Some Aspects of the Malayan Disaster 
in 1942 (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), 69. McCrum purports to be quoting this 
passage on p. 176, but comparison with the original reveals a very free paraphrase. 
Simson, a brigadier in 1942, was the Chief Engineer in question. 
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be devoted to both groups, and it is my impression that that is an 
accurate representation of the book’s contents. That is not necessarily 
a bad thing, though, particularly for the reader with no prior exposure 
to the Malayan campaign. In a more general sense, too, The Men 
Who Lost Singapore is a far cry from the sharply focused study 
of the civilian leadership announced in the prologue. This becomes 
apparent no later than the second chapter, “Harbingers of War,” 
where an overview is provided of the strategic situation in the Far 
East that includes, among more pertinent information, a comparison 
of Japanese rice production figures for 1940 with those from 1868. 
Although thoroughness of this sort will undoubtedly be beneficial to 
many, what McCrum does here is in some ways akin to beginning 
every book on the Second World War in Europe with an overview 
of Nazi ideology. In those parts of the book dealing with the actual 
fighting, although the author gamely leavens his account (as he does 
throughout the work) with such material as extracts from Legislative 
Council and War Council minutes, the correspondence, diaries and 
private papers of figures such as Thomas and Duff Cooper, and 
material from contemporary newspapers, it is nevertheless perhaps 
inevitable that military affairs at the strategic, operational, and 
even tactical levels should receive the lion’s share of the attention. 
The chapter entitled “Aftermath,” primarily covering the period 
of Japanese occupation, is technically not even necessary because, 
by this time, the “men who lost Singapore” had done their work; 
nevertheless, the author gratifyingly ties up loose ends by describing 
the fates, both during the occupation and postwar, of many of the 
principal figures, including on the Japanese side.
In light of the foregoing, I think it would be fair to describe 
this book more as a retelling of the Japanese conquest of Malaya 
and Singapore with an emphasis, where applicable, on the actions of 
the civilian leadership. If a failure to adhere rigorously to its stated 
purpose was its only problem, I would not hesitate to describe this as 
an excellent volume. Unfortunately, this book suffers from numerous 
difficulties, of which considerations of space oblige me to discuss only 
the most pressing. While the author writes very well at the level of 
the paragraph, as well as at the level of the entire book, which is 
competently organised, what he cannot seem to do is write well at 
the level of the chapter. We often see the narrative moving along 
briskly for generally anywhere from three to six paragraphs before the 
subject matter changes abruptly, usually going back to something said 
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before, without the extra line break between paragraphs customarily 
employed to indicate this. Subject headings within chapters, which 
likely would have helped to minimise this tendency, are not used. 
Time and again, phrases like “as mentioned earlier,” “as we have 
learnt,” or “as noted in the previous chapter” appear—a sure sign of 
a writer who has trouble organising his or her material. The opposite 
problem occurs as well; that is, the author not remembering that he 
has given us material previously. For example, we are introduced to 
Duff Cooper twice, in two consecutive chapters, in almost identical 
language each time. Worse still is the appearance of an identical 
block quotation from Duff Cooper’s autobiography twice in the same 
chapter.9 Greater diligence on the part of the editorial staff would 
have greatly improved McCrum’s manuscript in this regard.
Although published by a university press (NUS is the National 
University of Singapore), this book lacks any attempt at an overview 
of previous scholarship on its subject, normally de rigueur in 
academic writing. However, footnotes and a meticulously compiled 
bibliography distinguish this work from the products of the “retired 
British colonel” school of military history writing that were once so 
common. Certainly, anyone in future doing scholarly work on the 
actions of the colonial authorities in Singapore during the Japanese 
invasion will need to take into account McCrum’s findings. As for the 
more general reader, I have to say that I thoroughly enjoyed reading 
this informative book despite its flaws—which may have been due, 
at least in part, to a desire to release the book in time for the 75th 
anniversary of the surrender. Whatever the case, Colonel McCrum’s 
emphasis on the civilian leadership represents an unexpectedly 
original approach to a story that has been told many times before, 
and for that alone he deserves high marks.
brian bertosa, independent researcher
9  Both times McCrum has silently omitted a small amount of material appearing 
in the original passage. To muddy the waters further, the second time this extract 
appears he attributes it to a War Cabinet document in the National Archives, Kew. 
I have confirmed that the material is from Duff Cooper’s published autobiography, 
therefore I cannot see how the second citation can be correct. These irregularities, 
together with the problem mentioned in my previous footnote, do not inspire 
confidence in the reliability of the author’s documentation overall. 
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